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Abstract
This paper presents a theory in which talented entrepreneurs are identied as the key agents
driving the process of development and modernisation. Entrepreneurial skills are private
information, which prevents full risk sharing. Development into a modern industrial economy
might fail to take place, since potentially talented entrepreneurs may refrain from taking on
the entrepreneurial risks as a way to avoid income shocks. An interesting feature of the model
is the fact that the informational asymmetries are endogenous to the process of development,
as they are related to the heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills required in the manufacturing
activities.
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I. Introduction
Dealing with large swings in consumption is a central concern for all societies. Under com-
plete markets, individuals are able to diversify away all their idiosyncratic risks. However,
when markets are incomplete and full risk sharing cannot be achieved, agents may seek to
prevent consumption shocks by avoiding certain activities that entail substantial risk, even
if those activities should be carried out in a rst-best environment. This paper claims that
this phenomenon becomes especially critical in relatively poor economies that intend to start
the process of development and industrialisation. The argument rests on two main ideas.
The rst is that the behaviour of the poor is highly sensitive to the presence of income risks.
The second is the notion that informational asymmetries related to intrinsic skills are more
prevalent in the urban industrial economy than in the traditional village economy.
The importance of risk aversion in poor societies is conrmed by the evidence in Townsend
(1994) and Udry (1994). More signicantly, these articles show that a substantial amount
of consumption smoothing is achieved within village economies. However, the empirical
development literature also stresses the fact that risk sharing in poor economies is not usually
accomplished via impersonal market exchanges, as modelled by standard economic theory,
but tends to be the result of more informal arrangements between village members  see
Besley (1995) for a survey of this literature.
One key aspect in which village economies di¤er from modern industrial ones is in the
amount of information required for their e¢ cient operation and how well this information
ows. Within the village, information about peers and their behaviour appears to be rel-
atively unpolluted. This is conrmed, for example, by the success of group lending pro-
grammes such as the Grameen Bank [Stiglitz (1990)].1 In contrast, in the industrial econ-
omy anonymous markets and informational asymmetries are commonplace. Furthermore,
the relative complexity of entrepreneurial manufacturing activities, compared to traditional
agricultural tasks, means that the selection of the correct individuals to whom nance should
be granted becomes a fundamental issue to deal with during the process of industrialisation.
1See also the direct eld evidence for rural villages in northern Nigeria in Udry (1990), where it is argued
that informational asymmetries within those villages are unimportant.
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This paper presents a model in which risk-averse individuals are heterogeneous in terms
of their entrepreneurial skills. In particular, only some individuals in the economy possess
the required skills to become entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, those
skills are private information, which generates an adverse selection problem in the nan-
cial markets and precludes full insurance against idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risks. In this
context, potentially talented entrepreneurs might decide to refrain from investing in entre-
preneurial projects (even if those projects yield high expected returns), choosing instead to
remain attached to the traditional sector where informational asymmetries are not such a
serious impediment to risk sharing. Lack of entrepreneurship retards the development and
modernisation of the economy and, in some cases, it may even lead to development traps.
The model features an overlapping-generations economy where agents live for two periods.
The old generation may undertake entrepreneurial projects that are subject to idiosyncratic
risks. The probability of success in these projects is related to the entrepreneurial skills.
The young generation supplies labour, which is used as an input by the entrepreneurs. Since
wages are xed, all the (uninsured) risks must be borne by the entrepreneurs. Private
information prevents full risk pooling, and therefore a¤ects the amount of entrepreneurial
investment by the old, which in turn leads to lower labour demand and lower wages for the
young. An important assumption in the model is the fact that individuals display constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA). As a result, the poorer they are, the more strongly risk-
taking is deterred by the presence of uninsured risk.2 In the model, this implies that if the
old generation is poor, entrepreneurial investment will be low, and so will labour demand
and wages as a consequence. This feedback between investment and wages means that the
incomes of di¤erent generations will display persistence. Furthermore, when entrepreneurial
projects are su¢ ciently risky, this feedback may become so strong that it may lead to the
appearance of poverty traps and multiple long-run equilibria.
Regarding the CRRA assumption (and, more generally, that absolute risk aversion de-
creases with income), this essentially captures the notion that the poor are particularly
2This is actually a property of preferences with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Since CRRA
implies DARA, this property in present in the model.
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vulnerable to negative income shocks. Firstly, this feature seems quite intuitive from pure
introspection.3 Secondly, empirical evidence also conrms the fact that risk aversion de-
creases with income. For example, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) show that poorer
farmers choose less risky crops, even if this means sacricing expected prots, so that to
mitigate weather risks. Chiappori and Paiella (2008) found relative risk aversion to be con-
stant for a panel of Italian households. More strikingly, Ogaki and Zhang (2001) nd support
for the even stronger property of decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) using data from
Pakistani and Indian households.4
The main focus of this paper is on the evolution of informational asymmetries alongside
the process of development and its implications for risk-taking and growth. Banerjee and
Newman (1991), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999), and Newman (2007) have also investigated
these phenomena, although their focus is on the ability to provide correct incentives to
entrepreneurs in the presence of moral hazard related to e¤ort unobservability.5 In that
respect, by studying the problem of entrepreneurial selection when talented entrepreneurs
cannot be easily screened from the whole population by outside nanciers, my paper presents
new insights regarding the interplay between insurance, industrialisation and growth.6
Another strand of related literature is that on credit market imperfections and develop-
ment [e.g., Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997),
Piketty (1997), Lloyd-Ellis and Berhardt (2000), Ghatak and Jiang (2002), and Mookher-
jee and Ray (2002)], where typically credit constraints prevent the poor from starting up
investment projects or accumulating human capital, which would be optimal in a rst-best
3This is explicitly acknowledged in Kimball (1990) who asserts, "DARA is almost universally considered
a reasonable assumption, or even obligatory assumption, since [it implies] investing more in risky securities
as one becomes wealthier", footnote 25 therein.
4Evidence of DRRA is also found in studies that look at households data on asset holdings; e.g., Morin
and Fernandez Suarez (1993) for Canada, Guiso et al (1996) for Italy, and Blake (1996) for the UK.
5Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-Paul (1992), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also study the
e¤ects of imperfect risk sharing on development. However, in all these papers information is symmetric and
imperfect insurance arises due to the presence of technological non-convexities.
6A lengthier discussion of the relation between my paper and the previous literature on informational
asymmetries in development is relegated to the conclusion.
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world. Here, I focus on unwillingness to invest in entrepreneurial projects under imperfect
risk sharing, rather than on the incapacity to do so owing to lack of initial funds. Arguably,
both insurance and credit are relevant for sustaining a process of development as stressed
by Banerjee (2000), and my paper and those articles should, accordingly, be viewed as
complementary to each other.
Lastly, concerning the market failure studied in this paper; this is clearly not new. In
particular, the negative e¤ects of adverse selection on the operation of nancial markets have
long been investigated by both the corporate nance literature [e.g., Leland and Pyle (1977)
and Myers and Majluf (1984)] and the credit rationing literature [e.g., Ja¤e and Russell
(1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. The contribution of this paper is that it shows how
this adverse selection problem can severely menace the process of development. Furthermore,
the informational asymmetry arises endogenously during the process of development, as it
is inherently associated with the heterogeneity of entrepreneurial skills in the population.7
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the set up of the model.
Section III characterises the static equilibrium under imperfect risk sharing. Section IV
analyses the dynamics of the economy, specifying the conditions under which poverty traps
may arise. Section V discusses some technological aspects that can a¤ect the likelihood of
poverty traps. Section VI concludes. Omitted proofs are provided in Appendix A.
II. Environment
Consider an overlapping-generations small open economy in which life evolves over a discrete-
time innite horizon. Individuals in the economy may live up to two periods (young and
old). In every period t a continuum of individuals with mass normalised to 1 is born. All
individuals are born with an identical endowment of 1 unit of time, which they use entirely
7In the paper, adverse selection arises alongside industrialisation, and remains unaltered during the
process of development. More precisely, growth does not per se mitigate the adverse selection problem
(although, it does manage to help overcome it). A related paper, Jaimovich (2009), studies how increasing
sectoral diversication may help alleviate a similar adverse selection problem by improving the self-selection
of skills.
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to work while they are young. In the second period of life, when individuals are old, they
can choose either to retire or to become entrepreneurs. Retiring yields zero income.
Young agents may choose to work in two di¤erent occupations: they can work in the
agricultural sector, becoming independent labourers working in a communal plot of land; al-
ternatively they can work in the manufacturing sector as employees for the old entrepreneurs,
earning a xed wage !.
Any old agent may decide to become an entrepreneur. However, not all them would be
equally good as entrepreneurs. In particular, there exist two types of entrepreneur indexed
by T 2 fB;Gg, where B (G) stands for bad types (good types). The good types represent a
fraction  2 (0; 1) of the population and possess higher expected productivity as entrepre-
neurs than the bad types do, who comprise the remaining fraction (1  ). The fractions of
good and bad types are constant over time. Types are assumed to be private information.
Preferences
Individuals only derive utility from consumption when they are old. However, individuals
need to consume (at least) one unit of consumption good while they are young in order to
reach the second period of their lives. As a result, all the income above one they earn while
young will be saved and invested to provide for future consumption.
Conditional on reaching the second period of life, the utility achieved by individual i
born in t is given by:
ui;t = ln(ci;t+1): (1)
where ci;t+1 denotes the consumption in t + 1 by agent i born in t. Logarithmic Bernoulli
utility implies that individuals are risk averse with CRRA equal to 1.8
8None of the main insights of the paper strictly depend either on the need to consume 1 unit during
youth or on the utility function being logarithmic. See Appendix B for a description of the workings of the
model under a more general CRRA utility function and in which individuals consume nothing while they
are young.
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Technology: Agricultural and Manufacturing Sectors
The total amount of land in the economy is xed. Hence, aggregate production in the
agricultural sector (Y ) varies only with the total mass of agricultural labourers (L), according
to the following production function: Y (L) = L, where  2 (0; 1). There are no property
rights over land, thus each agricultural labourer obtains as income the average output y(L) 
Y (L)=L, which is strictly decreasing in L.
Production in the manufacturing sector requires 1 unit of entrepreneurial skill (coming
from the old generation) and raw labour (coming from the young generation). The return
of the entrepreneurial projects is random, subject to an idiosyncratic shock. There are only
two possible outcomes for the projects: success or failure. If an old agent hires l units of
young labour at the beginning of period t; then, in the event of success, the project yields
l units of output at the end of t, where  > 0. On the other hand, in the event of failure,
the project yields 0 output regardless of l. A good-type entrepreneur fails with probability
G =  2 (0; 1), whereas a bad type fails with probability equal to B = 1. Project outcomes
are assumed publicly observable at zero cost (this implies that any contract whose payment is
conditional on ex post project outcomes can be enforced by an outside court and will always
be honoured in equilibrium). Each entrepreneur is a price taker in the labour market and
must thus pay the market wage ! for each unit of labour hired. I assume entrepreneurs must
pay workerswages at the beginning of the production process, implying that the amount
! li equals the total investment by entrepreneur i.
Young agents will naturally choose the occupation (agricultural labourer or manufac-
turing employee) that yields the higher income. As a result, since the labour market is
competitive, and Inada conditions imply there will always be a positive measure of agricul-
tural labourers; the young will spread themselves among the two occupations such that they
are indi¤erent between them, that is, such that ! = L 1 holds.
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Financial Markets
All nancial transactions between natives and with the rest of the world are mediated by
specialised rms called nancial intermediaries (or, for brevity, nanciers). The local nan-
cial market is perfectly competitive and the nancial intermediaries enjoy perfect access to
international capital markets. Since the economy is small, nanciers face then a perfectly
elastic supply of loanable funds in the international capital markets at the international (net)
interest rate r = 0.
Financial intermediates may invest in a riskless asset yielding zero (net) return; this
asset could be thought of as either storage or lending to the rest of the world. They may
also nance entrepreneurial projects. They do so by buying shares in those projects. More
precisely, nanciers o¤er to buy a certain amount of shares of a specic project at a pre-
arranged price. Each of those shares entitles the shareholder to  units of output in case of
success, while in the case of failure shares yield 0 income.
More formally, a nancier o¤ers a contract [i; pi] to entrepreneur i, which species the
number of shares i of project i that the nancier would buy at the unit price pi.
9 En-
trepreneurs could (in principle) receive contract o¤ers from several nancial intermediaries.
Accordingly, let Qi denote the set of all nancial contracts o¤ered to the entrepreneur i.
When referring to the nancial markets, the equilibrium concept used throughout this
paper will be that dened in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Because of the well-known po-
tential equilibrium (non-)existence problem, the fraction of bad types (1  ) will accordingly
be assumed to be large enough so as to ensure the existence of such an equilibrium.
Remark: Financiers could also provide funds to entrepreneurs by means of credit con-
tracts at the interest rate r = 0. Yet, as will become clearer in the next section, in equilibrium
no entrepreneur will desire to borrow from nanciers via credit contracts. Intuitively, selling
shares to nanciers strictly dominates the use of credit, as equity markets allow not only the
raising of funds but also the provision of insurance.
9An implicit assumption is the fact that contracts cannot be negotiated in advance; in other words, a
nancial contract agreed in period t only covers events occurring during that period.
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III. Static Equilibrium Analysis
Consider the problem faced by the agent i of type T born in t   1. Suppose this agent
has earned income equal to !t 1  1 while he was young. His disposable income at the
beginning of t then equals !t 1   1: (To reduce notation, !t 1  1 will always be assumed
unless otherwise explicitly noted).10 Given !t, this agent solves the following optimisation
problem, where si denotes the amount lent to nanciers at the interest rate r = 0:11
max
si;t;li;t;[i;t;pi;t]
: E(ui;t 1) = T ln (si;t) + (1  T ) ln
 
si;t +  li;t    i;t

(2)
subject to: si;t + !t li;t = (!t 1   1) + pi;t i;t; (3)
i;t; pi;t
 2 Qi;t; and li;t  0. (4)
An equilibrium in period t is given by: i) a portfolio allocation
 
si;t; li;t;

i;t; pi;t

by
each agent i born in t  1, ii) a set of nancial contracts Qi;t o¤ered to each agent i born in
t  1, and iii) a market wage !t, such that:
1. Each portfolio allocation
 
si;t; li;t;

i;t; pi;t

, solves (2) subject to (3) and (4):
2. Given the set of contracts Qi;t: (i) No contract belonging to Qi;t makes negative
expected prots, and (ii) there exists no other feasible contract z, such that z =2 Qi;t,
which, if o¤ered in addition to Qi;t, would make positive expected prots.
3. The labour market clears, i.e.
Z 1
0
li;t di = 1   Lt, at a wage equal to the average
productivity in the agricultural sector, i.e. !t = L 1t .
10In any case, as it will be formally proved in Section IV, !t 1  1 will always hold in equilibrium within
a full dynamic setting see Lemma 1 in that section.
11Notice that the agent i may wish to optimally set li = 0, which we can interpret as retiring when old.
Notice also that the optimisation problem does not preclude si < 0 (that is, borrowing via credit is not ruled
out). However, unboundedness implies that si > 0 will always hold in the optimum.
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Incentive-Compatible Contracts and Entrepreneurial Investment
Financial intermediaries will screen types by restricting the amount of shares on their own
projects that entrepreneurs are allowed to sell. More precisely, the level of t will be set
low enough so as to dissuade any bad-type entrepreneur from mimicking the behaviour of a
good-type entrepreneur. The drawback of this screening policy is that by limiting t below
rst-best levels (which means that entrepreneurial failure is not fully insured), nanciers
might also end up discouraging rst-best investment by the good types.
Perfect competition in the nancial markets implies that in a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilib-
rium, any good type should receive a price pt = (1   ) for each of the shares sold to the
nanciers (that is, each share must command a price equal to its expected payo¤ when the
project is undertaken by a good type). Denote by lt the level of lt that solves (2) - (4) for
a good type. Note that a bad type trying to "disguise" himself as a good type should also
hire lt workers (otherwise, he would be assessed as a bad type by the nanciers and would
not be o¤ered the contract devised for the good types). Incentive-compatibility for any bad
type born in t  1 requires then the following to hold:
ln(!t 1   1)  ln[(!t 1   1)  !t lt + (1  )bt]; (5)
where bt denotes the maximum number of shares that entrepreneurs can sell to the nanciers
at the unit price (1  ), having hired lt workers.12
The right-hand side of (5) shows the utility achieved by an bad-type entrepreneur when
he replicates the portfolio allocation chosen by a good type. The left-hand side equals the
utility that any agent would get by investing all his rst-period disposable income in the
safe asset at r = 0 (that is, by setting st = !t 1   1); this investment policy represents the
outside option available to the old agents in the economy.
The incentive-compatibility constraint (5) can also be re-expressed as follows:
!t l

t  (1  )bt; (6)
12Implicit in (5) is the fact that the upper bound on shares, bt, binds in the optimum. This result is
formally proved in Appendix A see there Derivation of Equation (9).
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which has a very intuitive interpretation. It requires that, in the state of failure, entrepre-
neurs should be compensated at most for the total amount invested in the project, !t lt ;
this is the maximum compensation (or insurance) that can be provided to the good types
without attracting the bad types as well (who fail with probability 1).
From the discussion above, it follows that the optimisation problem (2) - (4) for a good
type born it t  1 can be rewritten as follows:
max
lt0;t0
: E(ut 1) =  ln [(!t 1   1) + (1  )t   !t lt]
+ (1  ) ln [(!t 1   1) + (  !t)lt   t]
(7)
subject to: t  bt: (8)
The solution of the problem (7) - (8), together with the incentive compatibility constraint
(6), yields the following result (the derivation of (9) is provided in Appendix A):
lt =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1  

1
!t
(!t 1   1) if (1  )  > !t;
0;
1  

1
!t
(!t 1   1)

if (1  )  = !t;
0 if (1  )  < !t:
(9)
The expression in (9) summarises the risk-taking behaviour of the good types born in
t 1 when adverse selection prevents full risk-sharing via equity markets. A crucial property
of (9) is that whenever (1  )  > !tentrepreneurial investment by the good types (i.e.,
!t l

t ) is an increasing function of their initial income, !t 1. This is due to the fact that
preferences display CRRA, which in turn implies DARA. When preferences exhibit DARA,
the total amount invested in riskier assets is increasing in the individuals initial income.
Since in this model part of the idiosyncratic risks must be borne by the entrepreneurs so as
to comply with (6), investing in the entrepreneurial projects entails a risky decision and will
thus increase with the initial income of the good types.
The equation (9) can alternatively be seen as the individual labour demand function. As
it is the usual case, the labour demand is decreasing in the wage !t. Notice, however, that
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the reason for this is not the standard decreasing marginal productivity of labour, but the
fact that entrepreneurs have limited possibilities to spread risks.
Equilibrium in the Labour Market
The last variable that remains to be determined in order to characterise fully the equilibrium
in period t is the market wage, !t. This variable is pinned down in the labour market, where
the labour supply derives from the occupational choice of the young generation and the
labour demand results from adding up (9) across all good types born in t   1. To avoid
the trivial case in which no manufacturing sector ever arises in equilibrium, I impose the
following condition:
Assumption 1. (1  )  > 1
The equilibrium in the labour market in period t is determined by the intersection of the
labour demand (lDt ) and labour supply (l
S
t ) correspondences, where:
lDt =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

1  

1
!t
(!t 1   1) if (1  )  > !t;
0; 
1  

1
!t
(!t 1   1)

if (1  )  = !t;
0 if (1  )  < !t:
(10)
lSt =
8<: 0 if !t < 1;1  !  11 t if !t  1: (11)
Notice that when !t  1, lSt = 1   y 1 (!t), where y 1 () is the inverse function of the
average agricultural output y(L). This is the case because when !t  1, the young must
be indi¤erent between working in the agricultural or in the manufacturing sector, hence
!t = y
 
1  lSt

.
Let lt and !

t denote henceforth the labour market equilibrium values of l and !, and
dene !^  1 +
h
1  [(1  )]  11 
i
=, where notice that !^ > 1.
Proposition 1 (Labour Market Equilibrium).
(i) Whenever !t 1 > 1, the equilibrium wage !t is a non-decreasing function of !t 1. In
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particular, if !t 1 > 1, !t (!t 1) : (1;1)! (1; (1 )], such that: a) for all !t 1 2 (1; !^),
!t < (1   ) and !t is strictly increasing in !t 1; b) for all !t 1  !^, !t = (1   ).
Furthermore, whenever !t 1 > 1, lt = 1  (1=!t (!t 1))1=(1 ), thus lt 2 (0; 1).
(ii) If !t 1 2 [0; 1], then !t 2 [0; 1] and lt = 0.
Proposition 1 describes how !t is inuenced by the initial income of the previous gen-
eration, !t 1. Figure 1 illustrates the results in the proposition for four di¤erent values of
!t 1, namely: !a; !b, !^ and !c (where, 1 < !a < !b < !^ < !c).13 Since a larger !t 1 leads
to higher risk-taking by the good types, labour demand turns out to be (weakly) increasing
in !t 1. As labour demand increases with !t 1, the equilibrium wage !t must rise to attract
some additional young agents from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector. This
positive impact of !t 1 and !t represents the key mechanism that may give rise to poverty
traps and multiple long-run equilibria in the following section.
13Although not drawn in Figure 1, when !t 1 2 [0; 1] the labour demand is a straight line along lt = 0
(i.e., lDt () coincides with the vertical axis). As a result, for all !t 1 2 [0; 1], lDt (!t 1; !t) and lSt (!t) intersect
each other at lt = 0, along the whole segment !t 2 [0; 1]; which is the result (ii) in Proposition 1.
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IV. Dynamic Analysis
In order to characterise the dynamic behaviour of the economy, it proves convenient to start
by stating the following result:
Lemma 1. ! 2 [1; (1  ) ], regardless of the value of ! 1, for all  2 f1; 2; :::1g:
Proof. Firstly, notice that the minimum value ! can take in equilibrium is 1, as this is
the average productivity of the agricultural sector when L = 1. Secondly, observe from (10)
that if ! > (1  ) , then lD = 0. As a result, all the young population alive in  should
work in the agricultural sector, whose average productivity would then equal 1. Therefore,
! > (1  )  cannot hold in equilibrium either.
From Lemma 1, it follows that we can restrict the state space of !t 1 to the interval
[1; (1  ) ]. When !t 1 2 (1; (1  ) ], the equilibrium in the labour market encompasses
lt 2 (0; 1). Therefore, young agents alive in t must be indi¤erent between the two occu-
pations, earning !t = y(1   lt ). On the other hand, when !t 1 = 1, labour demand by
entrepreneurs falls to zero, and all the young generation must thus work in the agricultural
sector, earning income !t = y(1) = 1.
Let !  min f!^; (1  )g. We can thus write down the Law of Motion for !t as follows:
Law of Motion:
8><>: 	(!t 1; !t) 
1  


!t
(!t 1   1) +

1
!t
 1
1 
  1 = 0; if !t 1 2 [1; !];
!t = (1  ); if !t 1 2 (!; (1  )] and (!; (1  )] 6= ;.
(12)
If !^  (1   ), then the implicit function 	(!t 1; !t) = 0 alone depicts the dynamic
behaviour of !t. Instead, if !^ < (1 ), the dynamics of !t are determined by 	(!t 1; !t) =
0 when !t 1 2 [1; !^], while !t = (1  ) when !t 1 2 (!^; (1  )].
Lemma 2. 	(!t 1; !t) = 0 yields a mapping !t(!t 1) : [1; !] ! [1; (1  ) ], which is
strictly increasing and strictly convex in !t 1.
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The value of !t is increasing in !t 1 for !t 1 2 [1; !]because entrepreneurial invest-
ment in t rises with !t 1; as explained earlier, this is a direct consequence of preferences
with DARA. On the other hand, the convexity of !t(!t 1) is related to the fact that average
agricultural productivity is decreasing in L, which translates into a convex labour supply
function (as that plotted in Figure 1). More intuitively, as labour demand grows in the man-
ufacturing sector, each additional worker that needs to be drawn from the agricultural sector
becomes increasingly expensive, because agricultural productivity rises as L diminishes.
Given the specic parametric conguration, we can nd three di¤erent types of dynamics
in terms of their qualitative features and their long-run equilibria.
Proposition 2 (Long-Run Equilibria).
(i) Suppose = [ (1  )] 2 (1  ; 1). Then, there exists a threshold level () > 1=(1 ),
where 0() > 0, such that: 8  > (), there exist two (locally) stable stationary equilibria,
namely, ! = 1 and ! = (1  ).
(ii) Suppose = [ (1  )]  1. Then, the only stable stationary equilibrium in the economy
is ! = 1. Furthermore, if = [ (1  )] 2 (1  ; 1) holds, but   (), then the only
stable stationary equilibrium in the economy is still ! = 1.
(iii) Suppose = [ (1  )]  1   . Then, the only stable stationary equilibrium in the
economy is ! = (1  ).
Proposition 2 shows that when = [ (1  )] 2 (1  ; 1), two (locally) stable long-run
equilibria may coexist in the economy. First, we have a poverty trap in which ! = 1 and
l = 0; in other words, an equilibrium where the economy remains poor and fully agricultural.
Second, there might be a high income long-run equilibrium in which ! = (1   ) and
l 2 (0; 1), so part of the economy works in the manufacturing sector. This equilibrium
arises when  is large enough; in other words, when the manufacturing sector is su¢ ciently
productive. Intuitively, Proposition 1 shows that (within a certain range) a larger !t 1 leads
to a higher !t; when  is su¢ ciently large, the entrepreneurial projects are so productive that
the positive impact of !t 1 on !t extends over an interval long enough that an additional
(stable) stationary point arises in the model.
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Figure 2 illustrates the three distinct cases presented in Proposition 2. In (a), a situation
leading to multiple long-run equilibria is shown. Whenever !0 > !, !t will be continuously
growing over time, converging monotonically towards ! = (1   ). During this process,
lt will also be rising, meaning both that the manufacturing sector is expanding and that
risk-taking by the entrepreneurs is increasing. On the other hand, if !0 < !, the economy
will converge towards ! = 1 (a poverty trap), where lt = 0. Essentially, in ! = 1 individuals
are so poor that they completely shy away from risky projects as a way to avoid the low
levels of consumption that would prevail in the event of failure. This, in turn, implies that
manufacturing labour demand falls to zero; thus, the entire young generation must resort to
agricultural production, driving down its average productivity to y(1) = 1.14
14The point ! = ! is also a stationary equilibrium in Figure 2.(a), but it is unstable.
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In Figure 2.(b) the poverty trap represents the unique long-run equilibrium. This sit-
uation arises when the failure probability  is su¢ ciently large. In other words, when
entrepreneurial projects are su¢ ciently risky, imperfect risk sharing prevents the economy
from breaking away from the poverty trap in ! = 1.
Finally, in Figure 2.(c), a case in which for any !0 > 1 the economy converges to ! =
(1   ) in the long run is plotted. In contrast with the example in Figure 2.(b), this
situation appears when  is small enough. Intuitively, when the failure risk is su¢ ciently
low, imperfect risk pooling does not discourage entrepreneurial investment too severely,
allowing the economy to grow over time and eventually reach ! = (1  ).
V. Discussion: the likelihood of poverty traps
The Risk/Return Trade-O¤
From Figure 2 it follows that di¤erent economies might experience divergent dynamics,
depending on the specic parametric congurations (in terms of ; ;  and ) that apply.
Of particular interest is case (i), from where it follows that middle-income economies are
those especially prone to display divergent dynamics, even when having started o¤ with
similar incomes per capita.15
From (12), we can observe that the stationary point ! that divides the two attraction
sinks in Figure 2.(a) stems from the following equation:

1  

=
!   !  1 
!   1   (!): (13)
Equation (13) implies, rst, that ! is independent of the specic value of  as long as
 > (), so that ! < (1   ) actually exists. A second observation that follows from
(13) is that ! rises with the risk parameter  (i.e., @!=@ > 0) ; this is the case because
the left-hand side is decreasing in  and  0(!) < 0. In that regard, when case (i) applies,
15Evidence of the world income distribution converging towards a bimodal distribution is provided in Quah
(1996). Furthermore, Quah (1993) shows that divergent long-run dynamics are systematically observed
among economies whose incomes were initially located around the world average.
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middle-income economies are especially susceptible to the risk/return trade-o¤ intrinsic to
di¤erent investment projects. In particular, middle-income economies that have access to
relatively safe technologies, even if they were less productive on expectation, might be in
better position to sustain long-run growth than those which can only invest in relatively
risky and highly productive projects.
Agricultural Productivity
An important feature of the model is the fact that the poverty trap is associated with an
agricultural economy. One interesting question that arises is then: is a more productive agri-
cultural sector more or less conducive to a process of long-run growth and modernisation?
The answer to the former question is not at all obvious a priori since higher agricultural
productivity encompasses two counteracting e¤ects in the model. On the one hand, it
increases the incomes of future generations, enhancing thus their willingness to take on risky
investment projects (a wealth e¤ect). On the other hand, it makes it harder to attract
workers to the manufacturing sector, raising wages in the economy which in turn reduces
entrepreneurial prots (a general equilibrium e¤ect).
A small alteration to the previous model can help shed some light on the relative strengths
of each of those two e¤ects when the possibility that an economy gets stuck in a poverty
trap is maintained. Let the labour supply (11) be now:
lSt =
1
A
"
1 

1
!t
 1
1 
#
, if !t  1; where A  1: (14)
The parameter A in (14) can be interpreted as an agricultural productivity parameter (the
higher A, the more productive the agricultural sector is). The general equilibrium e¤ect is
reected in that the larger A, the higher the wage !t that is required to attract a given
supply of workers to the manufacturing sector. Notice too that (14) keeps the property that
lSt = 0 for !t = 1. As a consequence, the stationary point ! = 1 still survives to A > 1.
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16Equation (14) stems from an agricultural production function with average output: y(L) =
[AL  (A  1)] 1, which is increasing in A for any L < 1. As before, y(1) = 1. A minor caveat with
this specication is the fact that y(1   A 1) = 1; hence average output goes to innity before L reaches
18
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a stable poverty trap in ! = 1
is d!t
d!t 1

!t 1=1
< 1. This condition now requires that = [A (1  )] > 1 , which becomes
harder to comply for larger values of A. From that perspective, economies in the vicinity
of !t = 1 benet from increases in agricultural productivity, as this fosters long-run growth
through the wealth e¤ect and turns less likely that they end up trapped in ! = 1.
Furthermore, a larger A is also conducive to positive long-run dynamics by shrinking
the size of the poverty trap attraction sink when case (i) prevails. This last result can be
seen from the condition (13) when A  1 is allowed, which reads: [A (1  )] = =  (!),
implying that @!=@A < 0.
Endogenous Interest Rate
So far the interest rate has been taken as exogenous. Although fully endogenising the local
interest rate is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief discussion of its potential implications
is worth attempting.
Notice that an increase in the interest rate, r, means that the expected return of risky
projects, (1   ), declines relative to that of the safe asset. In that sense, a higher r
or a lower  should carry similar consequences, as both changes would lead to a portfolio
re-allocation with a larger share placed on the safe asset.
One possibility that can be envisaged is r falling along the growth path. This would be
the case if r includes a country-risk component (a¤ecting both the lending and borrowing
rates), and this risk tends to fall as the economy becomes richer. In this scenario, a declining
r should create an additional source of non-convexity in the model, making it more likely to
display multiple long-run equilibria.
A di¤erent scenario arises if the small economy assumption is dropped, and we let r go
up as the economy grows and demands more nancing. In this case, an increasing r would
actually counteract the wealth e¤ect implicit in the model, dampening (at least partially)
the non-convexity implied by (12). My conjecture is that, as long as the interest rate does
zero if A > 1. In case the reader nds this property a bit bothersome, the rest of the analysis in this
subsection restricts the attention to values of L where y(L) is nite and, in particular, relatively low.
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not respond too much to income increases the convex portion of the mapping !t(!t 1) should
not be completely overturned, at least when !t 1 still lies in the vicinity of 1.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a model in which, along the path of development, the economy
evolves from a small-scale rural economy into an entrepreneurial manufacturing one. Such a
virtuous sequence of growth is, however, not guaranteed because private information prevents
full insurance against idiosyncratic shocks in the manufacturing sector, which may discourage
talented individuals from entering that sector.
The model shows that risk-bearing increases with income. This result contrasts with
Banerjee and Newman (1991) and Newman (2007), where poorer agents bear the risks,
while richer agents choose safer activities. In their models, riskier activities require agents
to exert e¤ort, which enters linearly in a separable utility function with decreasing marginal
utility of consumption. As a result, it becomes easier to incentivise poorer agents to put
higher e¤ort into the risky activity because their marginal utility of consumption relative
to their disutility of e¤ort is larger. Empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that
initial wealth represents a major factor determining entrepreneurship due to the presence
of nancial market imperfections see, for example, Evans and Jovanovic (1989). In that
respect, this paper contributes to the past literature by suggesting that adverse selection may
represent a key market failure that keeps the poor away from entrepreneurial activities.17
Risk-bearing increases during development in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999), although
the underlying mechanism is quite di¤erent from the one featured in this paper. In their
17A passage in Newman (2007) is worth mentioning here. He states "Since embedding the Knightian
theory [of entrepreneurship] into a standard moral hazard framework reveals the fragility of its predictions
[regarding risk-bearing], it is natural to ask what happens in the presence of other causes of imperfect
insurance." The results of my paper should not be understood as Knightian, though. Adverse selection
prevents e¢ cient insurance; hence the rich, who are less risk-averse, take on larger risks. Yet, entrepreneurs
here are undertaking a productive task (for which they are particularly talented), and not providing insurance
to workers through xed wages, which seems to be the essence of the Knightian theory.
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paper, the amount of decentralised information increases as a by-product of capital accumu-
lation which, in turn, enhances the precision of relative performance schemes within multiple
principal-agent relationships and enables principals to provide stronger incentives to agents.
Hence, in Acemoglu-Zilibotti, the trade-o¤ between insurance and incentives changes with
capital accumulation, favouring incentives over insurance provision as the economy grows.
In my paper, it is the change in agentsintrinsic attitudes towards risk as they grow richer
that induces further risk-bearing. Hence, the key trade-o¤ here is to do with whether or not
less vulnerability to income risk is enough to counterbalance the fact that adverse selection
becomes more severe as economies move from agricultural to manufacturing production.
An implication that follows from Acemoglu-Zilibotti is that policies fostering competition
are growth enhancing, as they increase the amount of information in the economy. In my
paper, in contrast, at early stages of development when individuals are still quite sensitive
to imperfect insurance, unfettered competition may not be totally advisable. In particular,
unrestricted competition implies that all types of agents may try to undertake entrepreneurial
projects, generating adverse selection problems in the nancial markets. In that regard, a
policy recommendation could be to charge an entry fee for entrepreneurial activities and use
the proceeds to pay to those who decide to stay away from those activities, as a way to clean
the pool of entrepreneurs.
Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Derivation of Equation (9)
Let us rst state the following preliminary results:
Lemma A.1. If (1  ) > !t, the constraint t  bt in problem (7) - (8) must bind.
Proof. Suppose (8) did not bind. In that case, rst-order conditions would yield: t = lt > 0.
But, this means (6) would be violated. Hence, (8) must necessarily bind. k
Lemma A.2. Suppose (1  )  > !t. Then, the problem (7)  (8) yields:
lt =
1
!t
"
(1  )   !t
  !t (!t 1   1) +
(1  )2 + 2!t   !t
  !t bt
#
(A1)
Proof. Since the constraint t  bt must bind, we can x t = bt an optimise over lt only.
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As a result, the following rst-order condition for lt obtains:
(1  ) (  !t)
(!t 1   1) + (  !t) lt   bt   !t(!t 1   1)  !tlt + (1  ) bt = 0:
Finally, from this expression, (A1) immediately follows after some simple algebra. k
Lemma A.3. Suppose (1  )  > !t. Then, in equilibrium, bt = !tlt = [(1  )].
Proof. Suppose (6) did not bind. In that case, nanciers could o¤er a contract carrying
t > bt, which would still screen out the bad types and that would make all the good types
better o¤. Hence, in equilibrium, bt = !tlt = [(1  )] must hold. k
By using the results in Lemmas A.2 and A.3, we can next replace bt = !tlt = [(1  ]
into (A1), to nally obtain lt = (1  ) (!t 1   1) (!t) 1 when (1  )  > !t.
Suppose now !t = (1  ) . Replacing !t by (1  )  into (5), yields bt  lt. In
equilibrium, bt = lt will hold, for a similar argument as in Lemma A.3. Then, good types
will optimally set t = lt, which implies that the optimal l

t can be found by solving: maxlt0 :
fln(!t 1   1)g. This last problem can be trivially maximised by any lt  0. In particular,
any lt 2

0; (1  ) (!t 1   1) (!t) 1

, solves the previous optimisation problem.
Finally, when (1  )  < !t, lt trivially equals zero, since by investing all (!t 1   1) in
the safe-asset, good types can obtain a higher expected return bearing no risks.
Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i). Inspecting (10) and (11) we can observe that, for all !t 1 2 (1; !^), !t is pinned
down by the following equation:

1  

1
!t
(!t 1   1) = 1 

1
!t
 1
1 
; (A2)
as (A2) yields indeed !t 2 (1; (1  ) ), 8!t 1 2 (1; !^). Next, totally di¤erentiating (A2):
d!t
d!t 1
= 
1  

"

1  

!t 1   1
!t
+
1
1  

1
!t
 1
1 
# 1
> 0:
In addition, since !t 2 (1; (1  ) ), from (11) it follows that lt = 1   (1=!t (!t 1))1=(1 ),
for all !t 1 2 (1; !^). Hence, lt 2 (0; 1).
Now, let !t 1 = !^ and note that lSt ((1  ) ) = 1   [(1  ) ] 
1
1  = () 1 (!^   1).
Plus, observe that: lSt ((1  ) ) < () 1 (!t 1   1) for any !t 1 > !^. Hence, since lDt = 0
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for all !t > (1  ) , and lDt = [0; () 1 (!t 1   1)] for !t = (1  ) ; then, for any
!t 1  !^, the labour market equilibrium yields !t = (1  )  and lt = () 1 (!^   1). k
Part (ii). For all !t 1 2 [0; 1], labour demand equals zero. Therefore, in equilibrium, lSt
must equal zero too; which requires !t 2 [0; 1]. 
Proof of Lemma 2
From 	(!t 1; !t) = 0 in (12) we obtain: !t 1 =  [ (1  )] 1

!t   ! 

1 
t

; which after
di¤erentiating leads to:
d!t
d!t 1
=
 (1  )

1
1 + 
1 !
  1
1 
t
> 0: (A3)
Next, from (A3), bearing in mind d!t=d!t 1 > 0 and  > 0, it immediately follows that:
d2!t= (d!t 1)
2 > 0;8!t 1 2 [1; !]: 
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i). First of all, notice that the point !t = 1 represents always a stationary point of (12),
since 	(1; 1) = 0. Next, given Lemma 2, it follows that a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for ! = 1 to be locally stable is that (A3) computed at !t 1 = 1 is strictly smaller than
1. Thus, replacing !t 1 = !t = 1 into (A3), we get: d!td!t 1

!t 1=1
= [ (1  ) (1  )] =:
Therefore, = [ (1  )] > 1   implies d!t
d!t 1

!t 1=1
< 1.
Second, since !t = (1  )  for all !t 1 2 (!; (1   )], whenever this interval is non-
empty; in order to show that !t = (1  )  is also a locally stable stationary equilibrium, it
su¢ ces to prove that, under the stipulated conditions, !^ < (1  ) . From the expressions
in (10) and (11), we can observe that:
!^ < (1  )  , 1  

(1  )  1
(1  )| {z }
M()
> 1 

1
(1  )
 1
1 
| {z }
N(;)
: (A4)
From (A4), it follows that:
lim!1=(1 )M() = lim!1=(1 )N(; ) = 0; (A5)
lim!1M() =
(1  )

> lim!1N(; ) = 1: (A6)
23
Di¤erentiating M() and N(; ) with respect to , we obtain: dM=d = =2, and
@N=@ = [(1  ) ] 1 [(1  )]  11  . Therefore:
dM
d
R @N
@
, (1  )

(1  ) R

1
(1  )
 
1 
: (A7)
Denote by ^() the value of  that solves (A7) with strict equality; that is:

(1  )

(1  ) 

1
(1  )^
 
1 
; (A8)
where it can be observed that ^() > 1=(1 ). Then, the expression in (A7), together with
(A8) and the fact that = [ (1  )] > 1  , imply:
1) for all  2 (1= (1  ) ; ^()): dM=d < @N=@ (A9)
2) for all  > ^(): dM=d > @N=@ (A10)
3) when  = ^(): dM=d = @N=@: (A11)
Combining (A9) and (A11) with (A5), we can deduce that M() < N(; ) for all  2
(1= (1  ) ; ^()]. Furthermore, because of (A10) and (A6), we can observe that: 9  > ^(),
such that M() = N(; ), and M() > N(; ) for all  > , while M() < N(; ) for all
 < . Using again (A4), we can observe that  must solve:

1  

(1  )  1
(1  ) = 1 

1
(1  )
 1
1 
; (A12)
from where it follows that  = (). This completes the proof that 9 () > 1= (1  ), such
that for all  > () there exists another locally stable stationary point at ! = (1  ) .
Finally, totally di¤erentiating (A12), we get:
d
d
=
2 (1  ) 2 [(1  )]  11  ln [(1  )]
   2 [(1  ) ] 1 [(1  )]  11 
: (A13)
Given that at  = , dM=d > @N=@, the denominator in the right-hand side of (A13)
must thus be positive. Furthermore, the numerator in the right-hand side of (A13) is also
positive, because  > 1= (1  ). As a result, it follows that d=d > 0: k
Part (ii). Note rst that @N=@ > 0. As a result, if (A4) does not hold for  ! 0, it
will not hold for any  2 (0; 1) either. Taking the limit on (A4) as ! 0:
if ! 0: !^ < (1  )  ,  (1  )


1  1
(1  )

> 1  1
(1  ) (A14)
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Therefore, if = [ (1  )]  1, (A14) implies that !^  (1  )  when ! 0, and thus the
only stable stationary point is ! = 1. Lastly, the proof that if = [ (1  )] 2 (1  ; 1)
holds, but   (), the only stable stationary equilibrium is ! = 1, follows directly from
the proof of Part (i). k
Part (iii). If = [ (1  )]  1  , then: d!t
d!t 1

!t 1=1
 1. As a consequence, the xed
point ! = 1 is locally unstable. Moreover, because 	(!t; !t 1) = 0 yields an increasing an
convex function in !t 1, it follows that:
d!t
d!t 1
> 1; 8!t 1 2 [1; !]. (A15)
Given (A15), it then follows that !t > !t 1 for all !t 1 2 (1; !]. Therefore, !^ < !, and thus
! = (1  ) is the unique stable xed point of (12). 
Appendix B: Alternative Specication of Preferences
Drop now the assumption that individuals need to consume one unit of income while they are
young (hence, they will consume the entire !t 1 in t). In addition, assume ui;t = c1 i;t+1=(1 );
that is, utility displays CRRA, where  > 0 denotes the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
From now onwards, restrict the attention to 1 < !t 1 < (1  ) . The optimisation problem
for a good type born in t  1 analogous to that in (7)-(8)yields:
l =
(1  )
(1  )   !t
8<:

(1  ) (  !t)
!t
 1
   1
9=; !t 1  (!t)!t 1: (A16)
Let "(!t) denote the wage-elasticity of labour demand in (A16); that is: "(!t)   0(!t)!t=(!t):
Lemma A.4. (i)  > 1, "(!t) < 1, (ii)  < 1, "(!t) > 1, (iii)  = 1, "(!t) = 1:
Proof. Available upon request.
Since labour supply remains the same, the law of motion can be written as follows:
!t 1 =

1  ! 
1
1 
t

=(!t): Thus,
d!t
d!t 1
= (!t)

1
1  !
 2
1 
t  

1  ! 
1
1 
t

0(!t)
(!t)
 1
: (A17)
From where we can observe that d!t=d!t 1 > 0 still holds true under this new setup. Next,
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dividing and multiplying the RHS in (A17) by !t yields:
d!t
d!t 1
=
(!t)!t
1
1 !
  1
1 
t +

1  ! 
1
1 
t

"(!t)
: (A18)
Focus, for the moment, on the case in which  = 1. Since  = 1 implies "(!t) =
1, which in turn also means that (!t)!t is a constant, we can observe from (A18) that
d2!t= (d!t 1)
2 > 0 still holds true in this alternative setup.18 Therefore, dynamics similar
to those depicted in Figure 2.(b) and Figure 2.(c) are still possible with logarithmic utility,
even if individuals consume all their initial income, !t 1, when they are old.19
However, to obtain dynamics where multiple equilibria coexist for a given set of parame-
ters like those in Figure 2.(a), a slightly stronger condition is required, namely:  > 1.
To see this, notice that a necessary condition for multiple equilibria to coexist is that:
d!t=d!t 1 > 1 when !t = !t 1, at least once. (So that the mapping !t(!t 1) crosses the
45 line at least once from below.) Set thus !t 1 = !t = !. Then, using the fact that
"(!t)(!t)   0(!t)!t, we may obtain:
d!t
d!t 1

!
=
(!)
1
1 !
 2
1  + "(!)(!)
;
from where it follows that "(!) < 1 is necessary for that derivative to be larger than 1. To
grasp some intuition for this result, suppose we are on the 45 line, so !t 1 = !t = !. If
"(!t)  1, an increase in !t 1 cannot lead to an even larger increase in !t, since that would
actually reduce labour demand in (A16) leading to a lower !t, rather than a larger one.
In contrast, when "(!t) < 1, an increase in !t 1 could lead to an even larger increase in
!t, since in this case the negative e¤ect of the higher wage need not completely revert the
positive e¤ect induced by a larger !t 1.20
18It must also be quite intuitive to observe that convexity, i.e. d2!t= (d!t 1)
2
> 0, should be even stronger
if  > 1, since in this case "(!t) < 1 and the numerator in (A18) becomes increasing in !t.
19One di¤erence with respect to the model in the main text is that the poverty trap would have ! > 1.
However, this is just because y(1) = 1, and may be easily accommodated with di¤erent specications for the
agricultural production function that still exhibit decreasing marginal productivity.
20Notice that the wage-elasticity in (10) is strictly smaller than unity. This is owing to the fact that
individuals must consume 1 unit of income while they are young.
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